PNEUMATIC VALVE ISLANDS

Consult the online configurator - CAD files on: www.asco.com Page 501 Series Valve Islands **502 Series Valve Islands** 11..20/30..44 503 Series Valve Islands 21..29/30..44 2035 Series Valve Islands 51..72 **G3 Electronics** 73..120 580 Electronics 121..154 501 Series Valve Islands, ATEX 155..166 *i* 502 Series Valve Islands, ATEX 167..178 *i* **G3** Electronics 179..182 580 Electronics, ATEX 205...228 622 Series Valve Islands, ATEX 229...232 ISO 5599/2 Valve Islands 239...256 Spool valves, 502 & 503 Series, with integrated M12 (ISO 15407-1) 259..272 273...286 Spool valves, 502 & 503 Series, with integrated M12 on subbase (ISO 15407-2) 293..300

PNEUMATIC VALVE ISLANDS

Quick Selection Chart

ports/positions	4 6		10 N		1/4	3/8	insta 3 - in	ant f	al the	read).D. I (Ø(1 12	(mm)] G) - 3 -5 1/8 1/4	5 4 <mark>3/8</mark>		3/4 6	2-1 M7		main operating pressure (bar)	flow at 6 bar △P 1 bar //min (ANR)	series	illustration	cabinet mounting	transfert plate	Zoned Safety	I&M Sheet	page
× 3/2 2 - 5/3	uma			ve i	sla	nd	s, s	ser	ies		1, 5	:02 a	and	50	3			8	400	501 11 mm + <u>Kits</u>	+	-	•		P	310 / 3044
2 x 3/2 5/2 - 5/3]]]]							-] 0=	2002	+				a a		8	650	502 18 mm + <u>Kits</u>	+ 28	-	•		P	1120 / 3044 -
2 x 3/2 5/2 - 5/3]] []			***					30 2	2 00 2		***			8	***	8	1400	503 26 mm + <u>Kits</u>	+ = 0	-	-	•		2144
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5/2 5/3	Elect				sla		s, s	ser	ies	203	35						****	10	3820	2035 41 mm		-	-		-	51
	Elec			Device	eNe	PRO	then FINE	Net/l ET®, l	POW	Modb ERLI	ous T INK,	slink TCP, PI CANo erCAT	pen®	BUS	-DP®,					501 502 503 2035		-	-			73120
									20	2		***]()=			8	400	<u>580</u> (501)		•	•			121
2 x 3/2 5/2 - 5/3	20=	2002	# -							30 =	2002]O=	3		8	650	<u>580</u> (502)		•	• -			121
															<u> </u>	a		8	1400	<u>580</u> (503)		•	-			121
	o-Bas	se N	Ιοι	ınte	<u>d \</u>	***		to	IS	<u>5</u>	59	9/2					***	16	1420 3165	<u>ISO1</u> <u>ISO2</u>		-				239
Sub 2/5 - 2/3	ies 5											ISO			***			26 n	5730	ISO3	9	-				

PNEUMATIC VALVE ISLANDS

Quick Selection Chart



ports/positions	pipe connections [D] - instant fittings [O.D. (mm)] [D] - internal thread (ØG) ports 2 - 4	main operating pressure (bar)	flow at 6 bar △P1 bar I/min (ANR)	series	illustration	cabinet mounting	transfert plate	ATEX execution	I&M Sheet	page
× 3/2 2 - 5/3		8	400	<u>501</u> 11 mm		-		E	P	157
2 x 3/2 5/2 - 5/3		8	650	502 18 mm		-	- '	(P	167
2 x 3/2 5/2 - 5/3	Cabinet mounting	8	400	501 11 mm	11/16	•	-	(P	233
5/5	eumatic valve islands, series 622	8	600	<u>622</u>		•	- '	E	P	229
G3	Electronics			501		•		€x	_	157
				G3		-			P	181
	Multipol IP65 Buslink DeviceNet [™] , EtherNet/IP™, Modbus TCP, PROFIBUS-DP®, PROFINET®, EtherNet/IP™ DLR			G3 ia NAMUR				E	P	99
				502		-	-	€x>	-	167
				G3		-	-	€2	P	181
580	Electronics									
2 x 3/2 5/2 - 5/3		8	400	580 ATEX (501)	9	•	- '	(205
2 × 5/2 -		8	650	580 ATEX (502)		-		€x		203




Series 501 valve platform





Page 45 **ATEX versions** Page 233



(11 mm)


Valves technology

Rubber packed

all pneumatic functions including double 3/2 NC and NO $\,$

Sandwich Accessories Plugged between valve and subbase: Sandwich Speed Control Shut off Blank station plate Pressure regulator

Multiwire or Fieldbus I/O Modules



Electronics

Sal Electronics Page 121 Ex Page 205 CAD3D Valve manifolds Page 3 ATEX versions + Page 205 Ex



Series 502 & 503 valve



M12 Valve ISO 15407-1



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Subbases

Single



ISO 15407-1 502:500 l/min ANR 503: 1200 l/min ANR

Double Joinable



ISO 15407-1 502:500 l/min ANR 503: 1200 l/min ANR

End plates



Side ports

Plug-in **Electrical** connection



Subbases

Single

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ISO 15407-2 502 : 500 l/min ANR

503: 1200 I/min ANR

Double Joinable

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ISO 15407-2 502 : 500 I/min ANR

503: 1200 l/min ANR



Pneumatic pad mount High flow

502:650 l/min ANR 503: 1400 l/min ANR


End plates



With bottom ports

platform (18 & 26 mm)





station plate

Pressure

regulator

Shut off

Pressure block






580 Electronics



SAFETY OF MACHINERY

Principle of the Safety of Machinery:

To guarantee the safety and health of persons exposed to the installation, operation, adjustment and maintenance of machinery.



Three key concepts for the design of machinery and their safety functions have emerged from the implementation of the new Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC:

- · A risk analysis prior to design
- A particular consideration of the quantitative aspect of the safety functions in addition to the qualitative approach
- The use of performance levels (PL)

Risk Evaluation:


The manufacturer or supplier of a machine must see to it that a risk evaluation is conducted to determine the health and safety requirements for persons involved in its operation. The machine must then be designed and constructed in accordance with the results of the risk evaluation.



RISK EVALUATION

"Good engineering practice + probabilistic calculations"

CONSTRUCTION AND RISK EVALUATION OF MACHINES



CONSTRUCTION AND RISK EVALUATION OF MACHINES

EN/IEC 62061 EN ISO 13849-1

Risk related to the hazardous event

Severity of damage

Frequency and/or duration of exposure F and Probability of occurrence Probability of avoidance

Probability of

Low risk

Required PL

Effects	Severity	Class						
	S	K = F +	K = F + O + P					
		3-4	5-7	8-10	11-13	14-15		
Death, loss of eye or arm	4	SIL 2	SIL 2	SIL 2	SIL 3	SIL 3		
Permanent, loss of fingers	3			SIL 1	SIL 2	SIL 3		
Reversible, medical treatment	2	Other measures SIL 1			SIL 2			
Reversible, first aid	1	SIL 1				SIL 1		

а P2 Р1 P2 Starting point for estimation of risk c Р1 P2 d Р1 P2 е

PERFORMANCE LEVELS PL a. b. c. d. e

SAFETY INTEGRITY LEVELS SIL 1. 2. 3

ANY ARCHITECTURE

- A --> Series arrangement w/o diagnostic function
- B --- Parallel arrangement w/o diagnostic function
- C -> Series arrangement with diagnostic function
- D -- Parallel arrangement with diagnostic function

DESIGNATED ARCHITECTURE (CATEGORIES)


- B,1→ Series arrangement w/o diagnostic function
- 2 --- Series arrangement with diagnostic function
- 3,4 → Parallel arrangement with diagnostic function



DESIGN PROCESS

EN/IEC 62061 - EN ISO 13849-1

EN/IEC 62061 - EN ISO 13849-1



B_{10d}: Number of cycles after which 10% of a random sample of wearing components fail dangerously – Value expressed in number of cycles.

DC:	Diagnostic Coverage	None	Low	Medium	High
		DC < 60%	60% < DC < 90%	90% < DC < 99%	99% < DC

CCF: Common Cause Failure. Measures to be taken to prevent a given cause (and its effect) from concurrently disabling the multiple channels of a safety circuit.

Mission time T_{10} : In line with "good engineering practice" as recommended in EN ISO 13849-1, components attaining this value must be replaced (precautionary principle).




FOR YOUR SAFETY

Only the pneumatic part is described in the form of a subsystem in these examples. Other safety-related components (e.g. protective devices, electrical logic elements) must be added to ensure the safety function is complete.

The examples shown here only relate to the stopping of hazardous movements. In pneumatics, safety measures concerning the interruption of energy sources, the evacuation of potential energy (pressure contained in a part of the circuit), and a "progressive" start-up after an unexpected shutdown should not be omitted.

To attain a PL = c, category 1 architecture


- · Safety function: Stopping of the potentially hazardous movement of cylinder 1A.
- · Functional description:




Input 'I': not represented, movable guard or light barrier, etc.Logic element 'L': not represented, PLC

· Calculation of the probability of dangerous failure:

1 cycle = 5 s	16 h	240 days	2,764,800 cycles



 B_{10d} (1V1A – series 520) = 130,000,000 cycles, i.e. an operating time of 47 years, MTTF_d=470 years "high"




By limiting the valve's operating time to 47 years, this corresponds to a PL = c




FUNCTIONS

To attain a PL = c, category 2 architecture

- · Safety function: Stopping of the potentially hazardous movement of cylinder 1A.
- · Functional description:





Input 'I': not represented, movable guard or light barrier, etc.Logic element 'L': not represented, PLC

Output O: Valve 1V1B Cross-monitoring in L1 of the supply status coherence of coils 1V1Ba and 1V1Bb and the limit switches 1S1	
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0V1: Energy isolating valve: ensures the system is exhausted in case of loop failure.


· Calculation of the probability of dangerous failure:

1 cv	rcle = 5 s	16 h	240 davs	2,764,800 cycles
ı Oy	010 - 0 0	1011	L-TO dayo	2,704,000 0yoloo

 B_{10d} (valve 1V1B - series 542) = 44,912,670 cycles, i.e. an operating time of 16.2 ans, MTTF_d = 162 years "high"

 $MTTF_d$ (sensors 1S1) = 45 000 000h, i.e. 11,718 years "high"

The case study shows: DC (Diagnostic Coverage) = 60% "low"




By limiting the valve's operating time to 16.2 years, this corresponds to a PL = c for the safety loop.



FOR YOUR SAFETY


To attain a PL = d, category 3 architecture

- · Safety function: Stopping of the potentially hazardous movement of cylinder 1A.
- · Functional description:



Inputs '11' and '12': not represented, movable guard or light barrier, etc.

Logic elements 'L1' and 'L2': not represented, PLC



Output O: Valve 1V1B	Cross-monitoring in L1 of the supply status coherence of coils 1V1Ba and 1V1Bb and the limit switches 1S1	Cross-monitoring of L1/L2 status coherence within the PLC
Output O2: Valve 2V1 controlling the rod lock 2Z1	Pressure switch 2S1 for transmission of signal to L2	conference within the r LO

0V1B: Energy isolating valve: ensures the system is exhausted.


· Calculation of the probability of dangerous failure:

1 cycle = 10 s	16 h	240 days	1,382,400 cycles
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 B_{10d} (valve 1V1B - series 542) = 44,912,670 cycles, i.e. an operating time of 32.4 years, MTTF_d = 324 years "high" B_{10d} (valve 2V1 - series 520) = 20,000,000 cycles, i.e. an operating time of 14.5 years, MTTF_d = 145 years "high" B_{10d} (pressure switch 2S1, dynamic rod lock 2Z1) = 4,000,000 cycles, i.e. a mission time of T10 = 2.89 years, MTTF_d = 28.9 years "medium"

MTTF_d (sensors 1S1) = 45,000,000 h, i.e. 11,718 years "high"

The case study shows: DC (Diagnostic Coverage) = 60% "low", DC (2V1) = 99% "high", DC* (2Z1) = 75% i.e. for channel O2, DC = 78% "low"



* "Good engineering practice" methods associate this type of component with a low-to-medium DC to cover any of the component's drift failures.



MTTF_d rating for each channel = low

MTTF_d rating for each channel = medium

MTTF_d rating for each channel = high


By limiting the operating time of the pressure switch and rod lock to 2.89 years, this corresponds to a PL = d for the safety loop.




FUNCTIONS

To attain a PL = d, category 3 architecture

- Safety function: Stopping of the potentially hazardous movement of cylinder 1A.
- · Functional description:





Inputs '11' and '12': not represented, movable guard or light barrier, etc. Logic elements 'L1' and 'L2': not represented, PLC

Output O: Valve 1V1B	Comparison in L1 of the supply status of coils 1V1Ba and 1V1Bb and the limit switches 1S1	Cross-monitoring of L1/L2 status
Output O2: Valve 2V1 controlling the two 2/2 "cylinder stop" valves used as braking units	Pressure switch 2S1 for transmission of signal to L2	coherence within the PLC

0V1B: Energy isolating valve: ensures the system is exhausted.


· Calculation of the probability of dangerous failure:

1 cycle = 10 s	16 h	240 days	1,382,400 cycles
1 6/6/6 – 10 3	1011	240 uays	1,002,400 0,000

 B_{10d} (valve 1V1B - series 542) = 44,912,670 cycles, i.e. an operating time of 32.4 years, MTTF_d = 324 years "high" B_{10d} (valve 2V1 - series 520) = 20,000,000 cycles, i.e. an operating time of 14.5 years, MTTF_d = 145 years "high" B_{10d} (pressure switch 2S1, dynamic rod lock 2Z1) = 4,000,000 cycles, i.e. a mission time of T10 = 2.89 years, MTTF_d = 28.9 years "medium"

 B_{10d} (2/2 cylinder stop valves 2V3, 2V2) = 60,000,000 cycles, i.e. MTTFd = 434 years "high"

The case study shows: DC (1V1B)=60% "low", DC (2V1)=99% "high", DC* (2V3, 2V2)=60%, i.e. for channel O2, DC = 78% "low".



* "Good engineering practice" methods associate this type of component with a low-to-medium DC to cover any of the component's drift failures.

PL Performance Levels

MTTF_d rating for each channel = low

MTTF_d rating for each channel = medium

MTTF_d rating for each channel = high

By limiting the operating time of the pressure switch and rod lock to 2.89 years, this corresponds to a PL = d for the safety loop.